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Greene: Property Settlements in Divorce Proceedings: Patterson v. Patters

PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS IN

DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS:
PATTERSON v. PATTERSON
Essentially two systems exist in the United States which
provide for the division of property upon the dissolution of marriage. The first is the community property system' which treats
the marriage as a partnership. Upon divorce, each spouse, or
partner, is entitled to one-half of all the property acquired during the marriage by the joint effort of the spouses.' The second
is the common-law property system. Although this system
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,3 it essentially stresses
the individuality of title to real and personal property.4 That is,
upon divorce, each spouse is entitled to such property which is
in his or her own name.
A majority of jurisdictions have attempted to ameliorate the
harshness of the common-law system by enacting statutes which
provide for an equitable distribution of property upon divorce,
without regard to which spouse actually owns the property.5

' States having the community property system are: Arizona, California,
New Mexico, Nevada, Idaho, Louisiana, Texas, and Washington. See generally
Freed & Foster, Divorce in Fifty States: An Overview as of 1978, FAM. L. Q. 105
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Freed & Foster].
2 See Greene, Comparisonof the PropertyAspects of the Community Property and Common-Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of
Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71, 82 (1979).

1 Id. at 99-100. The minority of common law property states cling to the concept of inviolability of title. But a majority of common law property states have
enacted statutes providing for a more equitable division of real and personal property upon divorce. These statutes vary, but can be divided into three groups:
1) Statutes which provide that all property owned by the parties is subject
to division.
2) Statutes which provide that only the property acquired during marriage
is subject to division.
3) Statutes which provide that only the property acquired during marriage
is subject to division, except that property acquired by
a) gift;
b) devise;
c) descent.
Id. at 83.
5 E.g., MASs. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 1981). This act provides:
Upon divorce or upon motion in an action brought at any time after
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However, West Virginia still belongs to the minority of commonlaw property states where the courts have no general or equitable power to distribute property, and title alone controls.'
In the recent case of Patterson v. Patterson, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided, inter alia, three
issues regarding property settlements. First, the court held that
an action to impress a constructive trust8 may be joined with a
divorce action. In so holding, the court overruled two West Virginia cases, State ex rel Collins v. Muntzing9 and State ex rel.

Hammond v. Worrell." Secondly, the court held that a constructive trust may be impressed only in those cases where the

spouse seeking the trust had contributed services to the other
spouse's business, and was not adequately compensated. The
court called these services "sweat equity" because they directly

contribute to the equity of a family business.11 Third, the court

in Pattersonstated that a spouse may receive a life estate in the

a divorce, the court may make a judgment for either of the parties to
pay alimony to the other. In addition to or in lieu of an order to pay
alimony, the court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any
part of the estate of the other. In determining the amount of alimony, if
any, to be paid, or in fixing the nature and value of the property, If any,
to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each
party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount,
and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities
and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future
acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also consider
the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or
appreciation in value of their respective estates and the contribution of
each of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit.
This statute gives the trial court judge a set of guidelines to follow to insure consistency and fairness. It is important to note that fault of the parties plays no part
in the division of property or the award of alimony.
Freed & Foster, supra note 1, at 116-17.
277 S.E.2d 709 (W. Va. 1981).
'A constructive trust has been defined by the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals as follows:
[Tlhat where one obtains the legal title to property through the influence of a relation of confidence and trust, under such circumstances that
he ought not in equity and good conscience to hold and enjoy the same
as against the other party to the relation, equity will impress the property with a trust in favor of the latter. Kersey v. Kersey, 76 W. Va. 70,
78-79, 85 S.E. 22, 25-26 (1915).
151 W. Va. 843, 157 S.E.2d 16 (1967).
i' 144 W. Va. 83, 106 S.E.2d 521 (1958).
277 S.E.2d at 716.
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home property subject to remarriage, regardless of whether
that spouse has custody of the children." This statement, set
forth in a footnote, expands upon the holding in Murredu v. Murredu which had limited the award of a life estate in the home
property to one spouse only upon the condition that that spouse
has custody of the couple's children.
The Patterson case began in March, 1974, when Edward
James Patterson sued his wife, Amanda Maxine Patterson, for
divorce in the State of Nevada." Before learning of the Nevada
divorce decree, Mrs. Patterson filed for divorce in the circuit
court of Logan County. Mrs. Patterson was granted the divorce
on the ground that she and her husband had lived separate and
apart for one year.15
In addition to granting the divorce, the circuit court ruled
upon two property issues. First, the court ruled that Mr. Patterson's attempted transfer of two parcels of land to his daughter
was fraudulent."8 Secondly, the circuit court impressed a constructive trust in the same property in favor of Mrs. Patterson.
Mr. and Mrs. Patterson operated a grocery store, in which Mrs.
Patterson worked but received no salary. With the profits
realized from this joint effort, Mr. Patterson purchased two
parcels of land in 1962 and 1966 respectively. 7 The circuit court
felt that Mrs. Patterson showed that she was entitled to part of
that property, and therefore the court allowed the constructive
trust.
Mr. Patterson appealed the circuit court's ruling on the
grounds that the court erred in two respects. First, he argued
that the court should not have entertained a property dispute in
the same proceeding as a divorce. Secondly, he claimed that the
court should not have declared a constructive trust in the prop" Id. at 712, n.1.
" 236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1977).
" The circuit court of Logan County found that the Nevada Court did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter because Mr. Patterson was not a bona
fide resident of Nevada at the time he instituted the divorce proceeding.

Therefore, the circuit court did not afford the Nevada decree full faith and credit.
" W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4 (1981 Replacement Vol.)
"BW. VA. CODE § 40-1-1 (1933).
One tract of land was purchased by Mr. Patterson in 1962 and is located in
the Island Creek District of Logan County. The second tract of land was purchased in 1966 and is located in Logan District. Both parcels were titled in the name of
Mr. Patterson only, and he operated a laundromat on each.
"
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erty.18 The supreme court of appeals, however, affirmed the circuit court and upheld the decisions regarding constructive
trusts and joinder of divorce and property claims. 9
In West Virginia, divorce is an area of law which is governed solely by statute."' In 1923, the statute which dealt with property proceedings in connection with divorce stated, in part:
"Upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage, and also upon
decreeing a divorce ... the court may make such further decree

as it shall deem expedient, concerning the estate and maintenance of the parties, or either of them.... ,,21
The supreme court of appeals in the 1928 case of Philips v.
Philips2 gave its most liberal interpretation of this statute by
upholding the lower court's decision that an equitable property
settlement may be made in the same proceeding that a divorce
is granted. The court's reasoning in Philips is similar to that
used by the court in Patterson,that is, that the ends of judicial
economy and efficiency might better be served if the two issues
were combined and heard in one suit.23
However, the interpretation of the 1923 statute by the West
Virginia court in Philipshas been seen as an anomaly."' To avoid
such similar interpretations in the future, the West Virginia
Legislature enacted a new statute in 1931, presently § 48-2-15,
which was purposefully more restrictive. It states, in part:
Upon ordering a divorce, the court may make such further
order as it shall deem expedient, concerning the maintenance of
the parties, or either of them; and upon ordering

. .,a

divorce,

the court may make such further order as it shall deem expedient, concerning ... the minor children.... For the purpose of

making effectual any order provided for in this section the court
" The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also affirmed the circuit
court's holdings that the Nevada divorce decree was invalid, and that the
attempted transfer of property by Mr. Patterson to his daughter was fraudulent.
"' However, the case was remanded to allow Mrs. Patterson to prove each
element of the constructive trust.
144 W. Va. at 88, 106 S.E.2d at 524.
2'

Barnes' Code, ch. 64, § 11 (1923).

106 W. Va. 105, 144 S.E. 875 (1928).
Id. at 109, 144 S.E. at 877.
See generally MORRis, LAW
ed. 1973).

OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA (1st
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may make any order concerning the estate of the parties, or
either of them, as it shall deem expedient.'
In the case of Selvy v. Selvy, 0 which shortly followed the
enactment of the above code section, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals interpreted the new statute as limiting the
trial court's power in handling property matters during a
divorce hearing. In Selvy, the trial court granted the plaintiff a
divorce along with an equitable division of property, which included a certain piece of real estate and $10,000 cash and securities which were in the defendant's possession but which allegedly belonged to the plaintiff.
The high court affirmed the divorce but remanded the issue
regarding property rights in order that the matter be fairly adjudicated in a separate hearing. In doing so, the supreme court
of appeals strictly construed the jurisdiction of the divorce court
as to the property matters of the parties to the divorce as arising purely from the divorce statute. Furthermore, the last sentence of the first paragraph of the new statute' clearly states
that the "court's control over the estate of the parties is indirect" and is "necessary only to enforce its decrees regarding
alimony' and maintenance."' In other words, the court stated
that neither real property nor certain personal property may be
awarded as alimony; however, these types of property may be
impressed as a guarantee for the payment of alimony."
Wood v. Wood," decided in 1943, also followed the restrictive interpretation of § 48-2-15. In Wood, the plaintiff sued for
and was granted a divorce and custody of the children. By way
of a cross-bill, the defendant requested a divorce, custody of the
children, alimony, $175.00 representing money lent, and a settlement of property rights. The trial court awarded the defendant
$1,375.00, representing the requested property settlement.
" W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1981 Replacement Vol.) Because the first version of
this statute was enacted in 1931, it will be referred to in the text as either "the
1931 statute" or "the new statute."
115 W. Va. 338, 177 S.E. 437 (1934).
= W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
' W. VA. CODE § 48-2-13 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
115 W. Va. at 342, 177 S.E. at 439.
See, e.g., Games v. Games, 111 W. Va. 327, 161 S.E. 560 (1931).
126 W. Va. 189, 28 S.E.2d 423 (1943).
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However, on appeal, the court reversed that part of the case
regarding the attempted property settlement, again pointing to
the restrictiveness of § 48-2-15 in limiting the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the property of the parties to a divorce. The
court further suggested that the defendant could have brought
an equitable claim to the property under § 48-2-19 of the West
Virginia Code," but stated that the grounds for equitable relief
were not adequately set forth in the defendant's cross-bill. Moreover, the court concluded that even if the defendant had pleaded
correctly under this statute, she would not have received a cash
property settlement because the statute "clearly contemplated a
restoration of the property in kind to the party entitled thereto,
and not a money recovery for the value thereof."'
In a third case, McKinney v. Kingdon 3 1 decided in 1979, the
supreme court of appeals relaxed the restrictive interpretation
given to § 48-2-15. In McKinney, the trial court granted the
respondent a divorce, along with "exclusive possession and use"
of the 1977 Volkswagen Rabbit motor vehicle, the title of which
was registered in the name of the respondent's husband. The respondent averred that the automobile was a necessary item in
the care and maintenance of her children.
The supreme court of appeals agreed with the trial court,
and, in fact, granted respondent ownership of the automobile."
In applying § 48-2-15, the court reasoned that the decree awarding the automobile, which concerned the estate of the parties,
was such as to make effective the divorce decree concerning the
maintenance of the minor children. It is important to note that
the court's holding was limited to automobiles; it maintained
that its holding was "not intended to affect the existing law concerning real property or drastically alter the way personal property is currently disposed of in divorce actions."3
The most important change made in domestic relations law
by the court in Pattersonwas that a circuit court may combine a
Today, the applicable code section is W. VA. CODE § 48-2-21 (1980 Replacement Vol.).
126 W. Va. at 193, 28 S.E.2d at 425.
251 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1979).
The court reasoned that title to the automobile was essential to its use
and possession, for purposes of paying taxes and getting insurance, for example.
Id. at 220.
11251 S.E.2d at 219.
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divorce proceeding with a property proceeding. In so holding,
the supreme court of appeals overruled the Muntzing and Worrell cases. Although these two cases involved property matters,
the only real similarity between them and Patterson is that the
three were divorce cases. Patterson is more akin to Philips,
Selvy, Wood, and McKinney in that each involved one spouse requesting the trial court to grant a particular item of property or
an equitable share of real or personal property titled in the
name of the other spouse.
The property issue involved in Muntzing and Worrell differs
markedly from that in Patterson.Each of those cases involved a
partition agreement whereby the couple seeking a divorce
agreed to allow the trial court to sell their real property and
have the judge divide the proceeds of the sale between the two
parties.37
In each case one party had a change of heart and had decided against the sale. In Muntzing, the supreme court of appeals
again strictly construed § 48-2-15 as limiting the trial court's
jurisdiction in, a divorce matter to only that part of the estate
that would make effectual a decree for alimony or child custody.
Therefore, the court held that a judicial sale of real property,
although agreed to by both parties, is clearly beyond the power
accorded to the trial court by statute. Furthermore, the court
concluded "jurisdiction could not be conferred upon the court by
consent or agreement of the parties. . . ."I'
Nevertheless, the court in Patterson construed the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure"0 as permitting the joinder of
the divorce and property proceeding, "to promote [judicial] efficiency and economy."41 The court reasoned it was unnecessary
to require a circuit court judge to "wear separate hats and to
conduct separate hearings, one to determine divorce . . . and
another to adjudicate equitable claims to property. ... ""'The
,1 Collins v. Muntzing, 151 W. Va. 843, 157 S.E.2d 16 (1967); Hammond v.

Worrell, 144 W. Va. 83, 106 S.E.2d 521 (1958).
151 W. Va. 843, 157 S.E.2d 16.
Id. at 848, 157 S.E.2d at 19.
10The West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure for Trial Courts of Record
were adopted and promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals on October 13,
1959, to become effective on July 1, 1960.

277 S.E.2d at 715.
4Id.
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court based this opinion upon rule 18 of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure which states, in part, that "[a] party asserting
a claim to relief . . . may join . . . as many claims, legal or
equitable, as he has against the opposing party."" This rule is
subject to the exceptions listed in rule 81 of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure; however, the court in Pattersonnoted
that these exceptions to certain domestic relations issues did
not apply to the present situation.44
The Patterson court stated that Worrell, in ruling that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear a divorce proceeding
along with a property one, ignored § 48-2-19 of the West Virginia Code." Although it is true that this statute confers jurisdiction
to hear property cases in a divorce court, the statute is limited
to that situation in which certain real or personal property
belonging to one spouse "is in possession, or under the control,
or in the name, of the other" spouse."
But it must be pointed out that in neither Muntzing nor
Worrell did either party attempt to prove a constructive trust
in the property. Neither party averred that real or personal
property belonging to him or her was in the name of the other
party. Rather, in each case the circuit court judge attempted to
partition the property of the parties pursuant to an oral agreement allowing the court to do so. Therefore, § 48-2-19 was not
pertinent to the court's determination in those cases.
Another argument that can be made against the court's
jurisdictional reasoning is the requirement found in rule 82 of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule, mentioned
by the court in Muntzing, states: "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts or the
venue of the actions therein. '4 7 Rule 82 therefore would seem to
," W. VA. R. Civ. P. 18 (1960). The rule states, in part:
(a) Joinder of claims.-A party asserting a claim to relief as an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join,
either as an independent or alternate claims, as many claims, legal or
equitable, as he had against an opposing party.
" 277 S.E.2d at 715 n.5.
" 277 S.E.2d at 714. Today, the applicable statute is W. VA. CODE § 48-2-21
(1969).
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-21 (1969)t
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 82 (1960).
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apply here to prevent the supreme court of appeals from extending jurisdiction in a divorce matter.
The most troubling aspect of the court's decision concerning
the joinder of property settlements with divorce proceedings
was that the court was unclear in articulating to what extent it
overruled Muntzing and Worrell. The court stated that it was
overruling these two cases to a limited extent.48 However,
because the tenor of the opinion goes to the substance of the
cases, a circuit court judge might reasonably interpret these
cases to be overruled in toto. Therefore the decision seems to
suggest that in a divorce proceeding, a circuit court can now
partition a party's property and divide the proceeds from the
judicial sale among both parties to the divorce.
The second aspect of the Pattersondecision set forth certain
requirements which must be proven by one party before a circuit court will impress a constructive trust upon the property of
the other party to the divorce. These elements are:
1) that the party overcome the presumption of a gift, W. Va.
Code § 48-3-10 (1931); and
2) that the party show that he or she is otherwise entitled to
the declaration of the constructive trust. This showing of
entitlement requires: (a) a showing that the party transferred to the other spouse money, property, or services, which
were actually used to procure- the property in the other
spouse's name only; and (b) that the transfer was induced
by: fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, breach of implicit fiduciary duty, or, that in light of the dissolution of
the marriage the other spouse would be unjustly enriched
by the transfer. 9
Furthermore, the court limited its holding regarding constructive trusts to apply only to business property, and to that individual who was a business partner with the other spouse during
the course of the marriage. The court referred to the circumstances giving rise to this relationship as "sweat equity."50
The court limited its holding in this way to make it clear
that West Virginia was not moving toward a community prop-

"

277 S.E.2d at 713.
Id. at 716.

SId.
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erty system. The court emphasized that alimony would still be
the type of compensation awarded to that spouse who gave valuable years of his or her life to the marriage. But to those spouses
who can prove the "sweat equity" elements of a constructive
trust and who are also engaged in business with the other
spouse, the court may award a portion of real property and/or
personal property which had been in the name of the other
spouse.
The elements set forth by the court as necessary for the
creation of a constructive trust are well chosen for the reasons
mentioned above. However, the decision, by limiting the use of
constructive trust to only those spouses involved in a joint business venture, will prevent those spouses who perhaps contribute heavily to the marriage by performing such "routine duties
that a housewife normally performs such as taking care of children, entertaining business friends, and otherwise being supportive of her husband ... ,"51 from having the opportunity to prove
a constructive trust. Although these spouses will, in most instances, receive alimony, this remedy may not be sufficient in all
cases.
Moreover, if the spouse is able to show the existence of a
business relation prior to the divorce, he or she is faced with the
heavy burden of proving the elements of the constructive
trust.52 The most difficult of these is overcoming the presumption of a gift between spouses." Furthermore, the spouse attempting to prove the trust must also prove that the business
services were "of such a nature that they, in a measurable way,
directly contribute to the equity of a family investment undertaking or business."" Therefore, it is arguable that since the
burden of establishing a constructive trust is so great, even
though the court has expanded jurisdiction of circuit courts in
divorce proceedings to include property settlements, the net
Id. at 712.
See note 38 supra.
Id. W. VA. CODE § 48-3-10 (1981 Replacement Vol.). This statute provides:
[w]here one spouse purchases real or personal property and pays for the
same, but takes title in the name of the other spouse, such transaction
shall, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, be presumed to
be a gift by the spouse so purchasing to the spouse in whose name the
title is taken.
277 S.E.2d at 716.
"
'
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result is not much different than before this case because so few
people would be able to meet the requirement to benefit from
such a settlement.
Another problem arising from the imposition of a constructive trust concerns the valuation of the services of that spouse
seeking to impress the trust. The Patterson court states that
"there is absolutely no presumption that business property
should be divided evenly."" The court stated that the spouse
seeking to impress the trust will receive property to the extent
that the other spouse was unjustly enriched by his or her contribution. The difficulty arises in measuring the extent of that contribution when determining what percentage of the property
that spouse deserves. The court gave absolutely no guidance in
this matter.
The third change in domestic relations law fashioned by the
Patterson court was to allow a circuit court to award a life
estate in the home property, regardless of whether that spouse
has custody of the children. Prior to Patterson, the West
Virginia court in the case of Kinsey v. Kinsey" had held that the
circuit court could award the wife and children the use of a
house, but that this would not be a life estate. The court upheld
this proposition in Murredu 7 However the Pattersoncourt, in a
footnote, expanded the holdings of Kinsey and Murredu by
stating that this award of the house is a life estate, and it is not
contingent upon the spouse's having custody of the children."
Two problems exist regarding the court's discussion of the
award of a life estate in a divorce. First, since the court removed
the condition of custody of the children before obtaining a life
estate in the home property, it is now apparent that a person
having no children may obtain a life estate. Furthermore, the
court fails to state which elements a circuit court would consider
in determining whether a life estate should be awarded. Second,
there is serious doubt as to what precedential value should be
afforded to the discussion regarding a life estate, since it was
set forth in a footnote rather than in the text and also because it
was dicta rather than a topic at issue.
SId.

143 W. Va. 574, 103 S.E.2d 409 (1958).
51236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1977).

" 277 S.E.2d at 712 n.1.
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In conclusion, the Pattersoncourt, by extending the jurisdiction of circuit courts in divorce proceedings to include property
settlements, has brought this area of domestic relations law full
circle. Originally these two matters could be brought before a
circuit court in one proceeding, but the state legislature enacted
§ 48-2-15 to prevent this extended jurisdiction. Because of this
decision, the circuit courts can once again exercise that extended jurisdiction. Though the court provided well reasoned standards as conditions for the imposition of a constructive trust in a
divorce proceeding, the burden of proof will be difficult to meet
and the value of services rendered will be difficult to estimate.
Moreover, because the court was unclear in the extent to whiich
it overruled two prior cases concerning partitioning of marital
property and because the court was unclear about defining the
circumstances necessary for a possible award of a life estate in
the home property of the divorced parties, circuit courts may
still be at a loss as to how to distribute property in divorce proceedings.

Rita Greene
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